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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Scope and intensity of Kremlin cleaning eased; Berezovsky speaks 
Amid flurries of rumor and speculation, many have wondered about the likelihood 
and extent of President Vladimir Putin's Kremlin purge of Yel'tsin-era officials. 
Several high-ranking figures were under intense scrutiny, particularly Alexander 
Voloshin, the head of the Presidential Administration, who seemed a likely target 
for firing. (IZVESTIA, 30 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Recent 
events have put this expectation largely to rest. Voloshin has managed to retain 
his position. Moreover, in a significant ceremony, Putin elevated former President 
Boris Yel'tsin to the Order for Services to the Fatherland, First Degree. "I think 
this is right and symbolic that it is in this particular surrounding that we are 
decorating the man who has done so much for the CIS to be set up and gain 
strength...," Putin explained at the opening of the CIS meeting. (RUSSIAN 
PUBLIC TV [ORT], 30 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) As a Yel'tsin era official, Voloshin may have received his unofficial 
acquittal in the court of Putin's favor. The public's honors to Yel'tsin indicate that 
his appointments are safe, for the time being at least. 
 
Additionally, Putin has consolidated power further within the Federation Council, 
following the resignation of Orel Region Governor Yegor Stroev, who has served 
as the council's speaker for the past six years. It is important to note that "Putin 
lavished praise on the out-going speaker," and that Stroev is not leaving office 
under pressure from the General Prosecutor's office. (ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, 7 Dec 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) In fact, the deal which 
resulted in Stroev's resignation and his replacement's nearly unopposed 
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ascension mirrors in many ways Putin's own unexpected rise to political potency. 
The new speaker of the Federation Council, Sergei Mironov, is a former resident 
of St. Petersburg. He is expected to solidify further the council's support for the 
executive branch. Since his "election," Mironov has suggested that the current 
presidential term might be extended to five years (RUSSIAN TV, 8 Dec 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The position of speaker for the 
Federation Council is understood to be the third most powerful in Russia. This 
development leaves only Prime Minister Kasyanov between the St. Petersburg 
Group and complete control of Russia at this high level -- a fact not unnoticed by 
the pro-Kremlin faction Unity. "All that remains is for [chairperson of the 
Legislative Assembly's Budget Committee] Sergei Nikeshin to be named Prime 
Minister and everything will be just fine," according to deputy Viktor Yevtukhov. 
(ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 7 Dec 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
However, Kasyanov does not appear to be going anywhere anytime soon. He 
recently presided over the railways ministry's 2002 Investment Program meeting, 
where he identified Minister Nikolai Aksonenko as a poor manager. (Logically, 
Kasyanov could not serve as the implementer of Putin's will in this case while at 
the same time being a target.) Aksonenko is an earlier victim of Putin's Purge at 
the hands of the General Prosecutor's office. Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the 
Center for Strategic Studies, said it was unlikely that the railways minister would 
be imprisoned, despite the threat of legal action: "They don't want blood, they 
need control over the financial resources." (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 29 Nov 01; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) While Aksonenko faces the harshest recent 
attacks by the St. Petersburg Group, it seems unlikely that he will need to follow 
his protégé, Boris Berezovsky, into exile. Thus not only the scope, but also the 
intensity, of the purges appears to be lessening. 
 
Berezovsky also has been in the media spotlight recently. Portraying himself as 
an unappreciated visionary, Berezovsky said in a November interview, "I'm 
convinced that those politicians who try to see forward and act counting with the 
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future are sure to be unloved." In the same interview he cited the need for a 
viable opposition to Putin's domestic and international agenda, and included this 
choice exchange.  
 
"Berezovsky: Liberal reforms are incompatible with the authoritarian system of 
government in Russia. It's necessary to return to the former political system 
constructed by Yel'tsin. 
Question: Do you mean oligarchic capitalism? 
Berezovsky: Let's not discuss epithets. It is a fact that reformers have managed 
to improve the situation in the country in the past 10 years by means of large 
capitalists." (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 1 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Putin responded through ITAR-TASS: "Society needs healthy political 
competition more than a fruitless struggle which only weakens the state system, 
spoils the authorities' image and distorts the basic democratic principles." (ITAR-
TASS, 1 Dec 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Although this comment 
was addressed to Putin's own supporters within the Unity and Fatherland Union, 
it is probably the friendliest statement he could issue on Berezovsky's vision. 
Then, on 4 December, Berezovsky published an open letter to the Nezavisimaya 
gazeta newspaper in which he calls upon "Voloshin, Anatoly Chubais, Mikhail 
Kasyanov, and others called 'the Family' by Boris Yel'tsin's enemies" to resign en 
masse before Putin can purge them, thereby creating the core of a new and 
powerful liberal opposition to Putin. The grandiloquently worded letter also 
contained extensive criticism of Putin's domestic and foreign policies and 
hearkened for a return to the Yel'tsin era of governance. (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 4 Dec 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
No resignations have occurred to date. "Underappreciated Visionary"? Perhaps. 
Critics have deemed Berezovsky's campaign to be empty of any real ideology, 
and merely an attempt to recapture prestige for his own purposes. (THE 
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MOSCOW TIMES, 5 Dec 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) However, in 
light of the fact that Putin has consolidated tremendous power, Berezovsky's 
statements may still attract adherents. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Services use 'war on terrorism' to expand their own scope  
The security services of Russia are taking advantage of the "war on terrorism" to 
expand their operations into Afghanistan. When Russian Defense Minister 
Sergey Ivanov announced that Russia would continue its goal of "liquidating the 
ringleaders" in Chechnya, he was drawing a thin veil with which to shroud the 
recent activities of security elements within Afghanistan. (ITAR-TASS, 0857 
GMT, 6 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1206, via World News Connection) On 26 
November, 12 IL-76 military transports landed and began to move in personnel 
from various ministries of the government. (INTERFAX, 0802 GMT, 26 Nov 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-1126, via World News Connection) Included among the first 
representatives of the new Russian embassy are members of the emergency 
ministry, federal security service and the foreign intelligence service. This 
provides the leader of operations, Colonel General Valeri Vostortin, many tools 
with which to further his mission of organizational and restoration work while 
establishing contacts with the Northern Alliance. (ITAR-TASS, 1529 GMT, 26 
Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1126, via World News Connection) 
 
While denying reports that two airborne regiments were deployed along with the 
embassy contingent, the Russian government has insisted that its personnel are 
there solely to facilitate humanitarian missions. Although this may be a priority for 
the personnel assigned to Kabul, it is not the only one. There are early indicators 
that they have an additional tasking as well. 
 
 5 
Among the first 100 personnel to arrive in Kabul were members of the GRU and 
SVR serving within the emergency situations ministry. They wasted little time 
before commencing extensive searches of suspected Al Qaeda homes. They are 
seeking evidence that will tie together Al Qaeda and various Chechen leaders. 
Chief on their list of Chechen leaders suspected of cooperating with Al Qaeda is 
the Saudi-born Khattab. (TIMES NEWSPAPERS LIMITED, 2 Dec 01; via lexis-
nexis) The searches have yielded nothing that would connect Khattab directly to 
Al Qaeda. (INTERFAX, 1735 GMT, 23 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1123, via World 
News Connection) Despite this the GRU and SVR continue an aggressive search 
program within Kabul in an attempt to gain information and to further Russian 
influence within the coalition against terrorism. After all, as an unidentified 
Russian intelligence officer said, "Afghanistan is much closer to our border than it 
is to Britain and America. We have been fighting Muslim terrorists for years." 
(TIMES NEWSPAPERS LIMITED, 2 Dec 01; via lexis-nexis) In this regard it can 
be assumed that Russia perceives itself as playing a much greater role in the 
region in the future, and intends to use the "war on terrorism" to further this 
objective. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Stroev certainly will not bite the hand that feeds him... 
Since governors can no longer be members of the upper house of parliament, 
Yegor Stroev, the governor of the Orel region, had to make a decision: give up 
either his regional leadership or his position as chairman of the Federation 
Council. On 29 November, Stroev asserted that "above all, he has to be loyal to 
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his people," and confirmed earlier reports that he would not participate in the 5 
December elections. (ORT, 29 Nov 01; www.ortv.ru) 
 
As his replacement, he recommended Sergey Mironov, the St. Petersburg 
legislature's representative to the Federation Council, whose candidacy is 
believed to be endorsed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Mironov worked 
with Putin in the office of then-St. Petersburg Governor Anatoly Sobchak. It has 
been rumored that Putin recommended Mironov for the post of legislative 
assembly representative to the Federation Council in the spring of 2001. Mironov 
rejects those suggestions, but he does not deny that some of his visions for the 
Federation Council fit with the president's. The new chairman plans to focus on 
"economic questions, the budget process, restructuring of industry, and tax 
policy," as well as "systematizing Russia's legal field." To accomplish this, the 
frequency of meetings will be increased to three per month. His statements also 
seem to support Putin's propensity for centralization, although, unlike the 
president, he would like to see Federation Council members elected rather than 
appointed. (KOMMERSANT, 6 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
Elected by a vote of 150 to 2, Sergei Mironov delighted many cynics with one of 
his first pronouncements -- that the current four-year presidential term in Russia 
should be extended by at least one year, to "allow for a wider window of 
opportunity to carry out reforms in the country." Mironov did include a disclaimer: 
"I would not say that such changes would be made during Putin's presidency... I 
believe that four years is not enough, whoever is the president," but most are 
convinced that the Federation Council is now firmly under the control of the 
Kremlin. (ITAR-TASS, 10 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
MEDIA 
...while the government will not protect those who criticize it... 
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Over the last few weeks, attacks on the employees of TV-6 have become more 
frequent. 
 
In October, the anchor of Zemlya-Vozdukh [Earth-Air] was stabbed twice with a 
screwdriver (13 October) and TV-6 General Director Yevgeny Kisilev was 
harassed (26 October) by "hooligans," the police maintain, despite the fact that 
the hooligans themselves admitted that they were hired. 
 
Then: On 19 November, unidentified persons threatened Sergei Bazhenkov, the 
director of the Pilot TV company, which produces the program Tushite Svet! 
[Turn Out the Light!], with physical injury. On 20 November, the neighbors of 
Seichas [Now] correspondent Svetlana Kunitsyna stormed into her apartment 
and brutally assaulted her. And on 25 November, the apartment of Itogo [In 
Summary] anchor Igor Irteniev was robbed -- the burglary was reported to have 
been strangely methodical.  
 
On the night of 29 November, three men were waiting for Il'dar Zhandarev in front 
of the elevator on the landing of his floor. They knocked him off his feet, 
handcuffed him, taped his mouth and eyes and dragged him into the stairwell. As 
they took his apartment keys out of his pocket they told him that they were hired 
to do so, that his television shows -- Interesnoye Kino [Interesting Cinema] and 
Bez Protokola [Without a Protocol] -- were not to their liking, and that he needs to 
leave Moscow in two weeks. Zhandarev was able to get to his feet and ring a 
neighbor's doorbell. In the meantime the men stole $400, two cellular phones and 
a video camera from his apartment. 
 
Police reports have been filed concerning all of the attacks and the administration 
of TV-6 has asked the Moscow police department to analyze carefully all of these 
assaults. TV-6 representatives do not dare accuse the government of 
harassment -- instead they suppose that a rival company, jealous of TV-6's 
recent success, is to blame. (NTVRU, 30 Nov 01; via www.ntvru.com) A 
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statement put out by TV-6 management, however, does accuse the authorities of 
not taking any significant actions to stop the atrocities, and of upholding LUKoil's 
actions to liquidate the television channel. (INTERFAX, 0605 GMT, 3 Dec 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-1203, via World News Connection) 
 
...or don't support its preferred candidates 
In the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Viktoriya-Press, a local newspaper critical of the 
presidential election candidates, recently experienced both a boom in circulation 
-- 205,000 copies -- and a surge of checkups by the local prosecutor's office. 
Authorities even closed two radio stations belonging to the same media company 
for a month on the pretext of paperwork (i.e., red tape while the stations sought 
permission to install a more powerful transmitter) and arrested the general 
director of the company, Aleksandr Glotov, and four journalists. In the prison cell 
Glotov had a heart attack. No charges had been brought against him, and he 
was released from the prison's hospital ward after signing a promise not to leave 
the city. (REN TV, 1000 GMT, 7 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
REGIONS 
Political mayhem in Yakutia 
The election in Yakutia has been at center stage because the Kremlin hoped to 
add the republic-controlled 32-percent packet of shares of the ALROSA Diamond 
Company to the 32 percent already owned by the Federal Property Committee in 
exchange for letting incumbent Mikhail Nikolaev run for a third term in office. 
After Nikolaev refused, the Yakutian Prosecutor's Office arrested several experts 
of his election staff, the Accounts Chamber has accused him of embezzlement 
during the restoration of the city of Lensk, and Vyacheslav Shtyrev, the head of 
ALROSA and a popular candidate who had been eliminated from the presidential 
election for missing the registration deadline, has been put back on the ballot. 
(IZVESTIYA, 3 Dec 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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Shtyrov has stated openly his opposition to the planned transfer of the Yakut-
held ALROSA stocks to a trust managed by the local Sakha-Invest Fund, instead 
of the government, and expressed his willingness to cooperate with the center. 
(IZVESTIA BIZEKON REPORT, 5 Dec 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
ALROSA accounts for about 20 percent of world diamond production, provides 
75 percent of the budget receipts in share royalties, and currently is negotiating a 
$4 billion five-year agreement with De Beers. (VEDEMOSTI, 4 Dec 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
NATO expansion (or is it enlargement?), Russia, and the rest of the story... 
The evolving relationship between NATO and Russian remains a hot topic. Over 
the weeks since the Bush-Putin meetings in Washington and Crawford, Texas, 
the NATO-Russia relationship has taken center stage. Surprisingly, this issue is 
getting more international press than any other, including the ABM treaty status, 
nuclear force reduction, or even Russian contributions to the "war on terrorism." 
 
Chief among Russia's NATO suitors are British Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
NATO Secretary-General George Robertson. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 28 Nov 01) 
Initial proposals to deepen the existing working relationships between the 
alliance and Moscow were nebulous to say the least. Prime Minister Blair seized 
the initiative by making a bold proposal to institute a new forum called the 
Russia-North Atlantic Council. (AP, 28 Nov 01; via yahoo.com) The most 
interesting aspect of Blair's proposal is that it appears to have come as a surprise 
to many of the 19 NATO members. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 28 Nov 
01) Several alliance members, among them France and Germany, appear to 
have been completely unprepared for Blair's radically more formal relationship 
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which envisioned a Russian voting role on some matters of NATO policy. (ITAR-
TASS, 1354 GMT, 30 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Blair neither made it clear on which issues Russia might vote, nor did 
he (more importantly) specify whether the Russians would have the same veto 
power as NATO members. This issue has brought the most reaction from 
alliance members.  
 
In response, both Secretary-General Robertson and PM Blair have made every 
effort to refine their proposals and to clarify their remarks. Robertson visited 
Moscow on 23-25 November in an effort to solidify the growing relationship. 
During the visit, he regularly affirmed the desire for NATO to deepen the 
relationship between the alliance and Russia, and even committed NATO to 
"represent no threat at all to Russia." (TV6, 1200 GMT, 23 Nov 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) One noteworthy element is that 
Robertson no longer refers to increasing NATO membership as "expansion" but 
rather as the less-threatening "enlargement." (Jamestown Foundation 
MONITOR, 5 Dec 01) 
 
NATO has signaled its seriousness towards this new relationship by better 
defining issues with which the Russians may play a role at the highest levels of 
NATO. In a statement released at the end of the foreign ministers' meeting at the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's highest decision-making body, the issues 
for which Russian cooperative involvement is sought currently were defined. 
Besides the struggle against terrorism, Russia and NATO suggested that they 
could work together in such areas as crisis management, nonproliferation, arms 
control, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military 
cooperation and civil emergencies. (AP, 7 Dec 01; via yahoonews.com) They 
also moved closer to defining the so-called "19 plus 1" formula for how the 
Russians would be given the right to vote, or to veto, in the proposed new body. 
The NAC has deferred formalizing the new construct until May when its next set 
of ministerial meetings is scheduled to take place in Iceland. (REUTERS, 8 Dec 
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01; via yahoonews.com) There have been some unsubstantiated reports in the 
press that the US, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have expressed the 
desire to slow down the formalization of a NATO-Russian relationship. 
(REUTERS, AP, 7 Dec 01; via yahoonews.com) However, it seems clear that 
from the NATO side there is concrete movement towards a larger role for Russia 
in the alliance. 
 
In Russia, however, Putin has been able to parlay the entire NATO issue into 
another policy success for himself. He has kept the focus in his speeches and 
press conferences on limiting the eastward expansion of NATO. (RIA, 0925 
GMT, 29 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) He also 
has made it quite clear that Russia's movement towards NATO will be on 
Moscow's terms. "....I would like to repeat again: Russia does not intend to queue 
up for NATO membership," Putin said during a recent public TV forum. 
(RUSSIAN PUBLIC TV, 1500 GMT, 22 Nov 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) It is clear that he doesn't want to seem too eager to 
be drawn into a Russian-NATO relationship not to his liking nor one that he can't 
say is in the best interests of the state. It is also unlikely that Putin will establish a 
broad NATO relationship at the expense of bilateral relationships with individual 
NATO countries or allow any close scrutiny of the Russian military. (See THE 
NIS OBSERVED, 28 Nov 01) 
 
There has been remarkable solidarity in Russia concerning this rapprochement 
with NATO. Even senior military leaders, who often have clashed with Putin's 
military policy, appear generally to favor closer ties with NATO. During some very 
pointed remarks General Staff Deputy Chief Colonel General Yury Baluevsky 
said that he supported Putin's efforts and that "Moscow is prepared to expand 
cooperation with NATO, as long as it is done under conditions that safeguard 
Russian national security interests." (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 5 Dec 
01) Though Baluevsky was critical of Putin concerning possible flexibility on the 
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ABM treaty and reductions in warheads, he expressed the defense ministry's 
general view that increased cooperation with NATO is a good thing. 
 
The future remains uncertain for NATO-Russian relations. However, there are 
three major conclusions that can be drawn from the events so far. First, the 
nature of the formal arrangements between the two countries will change by the 
NATO ministerial meetings in Iceland next May. The particulars will depend on 
events, personalities, and other exchanges occurring between now and then. 
However, it is clear that the UK prime minister and the NATO secretary-general 
want that relationship to be deeper and more formal. Second, Russia, more 
specifically President Putin, is in no hurry to enlist in NATO. He doesn't want to 
be tied down by the cumbersome alliance; it is more useful to be courted and see 
what concessions he can garner in the process. NATO's interest in Russia could 
be an effective springboard to membership in the World Trade Organization or 
even increased levels of Russian participation in the European Union. Finally, the 
US remains committed to deepening its relationship with Russia. President Bush 
has stated repeatedly his desire for increased cooperation with Russia and 
greater trust between himself and Putin. However, a strong Russian presence in 
NATO dilutes US primacy in Russian relations with the West and it introduces a 
complication for US dominance in NATO. Though Blair and Robertson have 
claimed US support for their initiatives, the US officials have been strangely silent 
regarding changing the Russian-NATO relationship. How the US policy evolves 
will be the lynchpin in its success or failure and will be the barometer to watch 
until next May. 
 
Russia in the Middle East -- stirring the pot... 
In November Russian leaders met with King Abdallah II of Jordan. Abdallah's 
visit was aimed at keeping Russia involved in the Middle Eastern peace 
negotiations. The Jordanian monarch clearly stated that "Russia, side by side 
with the USA and Europe must play a vital role to end the circle of violence in the 
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Palestinian territories and prepare the proper ambience to put the peace process 
on the right track." (PETRA-JNA, 24 Nov 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The substance of the talks was limited, resulting in only a modest military-
technical agreement between the two countries which could result in a few million 
dollars in arms sales, including some armored vehicles, tanks, and perhaps 
some upgraded radar components for the Jordanians. (KOMMERSANT, 27 Nov 
01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The important aspect 
of the meetings was the king's endorsement of a central role for Russia in the 
Middle East peace process. 
 
Abdallah views himself as the successor to his father King Hussein, and in this 
role wants to be a voice for moderation, peace, and stability in the region. 
However, he walks a fine line considering the large Palestinian minority in Jordan 
and the fact that his reign is secured by a series of alliances within his own 
country, most importantly with the Jordanian military. It is crucial for Jordan to 
have Russia as a counterpoint to the dominant US presence in the region. 
 
It is also important for the Russians to play a major regional role. First, by 
becoming a focal point in the volatile Middle East peace process, Russia 
continues to push towards regaining the status of world power. Further, by doing 
so Russia seems a significant player in an area where the US views itself as the 
lead negotiator. Finally, active involvement in the Middle East keeps Russia 
highly visible on the world stage, giving Moscow increased prestige and power 
especially among developing nations. 
 
King Abdallah and President Putin also touched briefly on both nations' mutual 
interest in Iraq. In a joint statement, the two leaders said that a continued push in 
the UN for a relaxation of sanctions and a concerted effort to bring Iraq back into 
the family of nations is the "best approach." (ITAR-TASS, 1052 GMT, 26 Nov 01; 
 14 
BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The meeting preceded the 
planned visit by Russia's ambassador-at-large, Nikolay Kartuzov, to Baghdad. 
 
During his Baghdad visit, Kartuzov expressed his desire to see sanctions 
reduced and his opposition to altering existing restrictions on Iraq along the lines 
of US-sponsored "smart sanctions" which are more flexible and designed to 
increase or decrease pressure on Iraq depending on Baghdad's compliance. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1202 GMT, 5 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) He also called the relationship between Russia and Iraq "special" and 
hoped to see it continue to "deepen." 
 
With the focus of US attention in its war on terrorism now turning towards Iraq, 
this "special relationship" could prove to be a serious sore spot in the thaw 
between Moscow and Washington. The Russian side has long defended Iraq in 
the UN Security Council and has tried to torpedo sanctions against Baghdad. 
However, if accusations made by the US that Iraq is supporting international 
terrorism, or worse manufacturing and exporting weapons of mass destruction, 
are proven publicly, then Russia may be forced to choose between its old friend 
Saddam or its new partners in Washington. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Walter Jackson 
 
Peacekeepers or occupation force? 
Two years after Russia agreed to withdraw troops from Georgia and Moldova, 
Moscow slowly is beginning to comply with the accords reached at the 1999 
Istanbul summit by the Organization for Security and Cooperation on Europe 
(OSCE). A substantial amount of the military hardware removed from Moldova 
and Abkhazia is too old even to be sold, and will be scrapped or, in the case of 
ammunition, exploded. According to OSCE spokesman Matti Sidoroff, for the first 
 15 
time separatist authorities in Moldova refrained from preventing OSCE mission 
members from reaching Kolbasna, as they have in the past, allowing for the 
verification and inspection of the departing military trains. (ITAR-TASS, 1 Dec 01; 
via RFE/RL Newsline) 
 
In Georgia, Russian troops are being renamed "peacekeepers" at the Russian 
garrison at Gudauta. According to the Istanbul accords, the base at Gudauta was 
to be turned over to the Georgian defense ministry by July 2001. Instead, Russia 
merely has reclassified existing military forces. (Of course, these are not 
peacekeepers in accordance with UN-recognized definitions, since the units are 
composed entirely of Russian forces.) This only impedes the peace process 
within Georgia. According to Georgian Foreign Ministry spokesman Kakha 
Sikhuralidze, so far 375 servicemen from the base have joined the 
"peacekeeping" force; there are still 600 Russian servicemen, 34 pieces of 
special machinery and 6 air-defense systems at the base. "The stay of these 
servicemen in Gudauta is inconsistent with the peacekeeping force's mandate 
because they are stationed outside the security zone, which is far from Gudauta. 
Furthermore, Russia is ignoring the provision of the Istanbul agreements under 
which the infrastructure of the base must be handed over to the Georgian 
Defense Ministry," he said. (GEORGIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT, 16 
Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1116, via World News Connection) 
 
According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the 1999 Istanbul commitments 
concerning Russian troop withdrawal from Abkhazia have been honored "not 
only de jure but also de facto." (INTERFAX, 5 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1105, via 
World News Connection) Russia's view of "de facto" must be different from that 
of everyone else present at the 1999 summit. In the broadest definition of 
honoring the agreement, the basic assumption is that sovereign Georgian troops 
would command the Gudauta base, which also could support Russian 
peacekeeping forces if their presence was requested, which of course it has not 
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been. How effective have the Russian troops really been in western Georgia? 
One recent example comes immediately to mind. 
 
The Great Georgian Train Robbery 
On a dark and stormy night, on 24 October, in the Georgian region of Abkhazia, 
the first train robbery of the 21st century occurred. Gunmen didn't just rob the 
military train bound for Russia, they stole it, along with an undisclosed amount of 
Russian military hardware (including four BUK surface-to-air missile systems 
worth an estimated 236 million rubles) from the 50th Russian military base in 
Abkhazia. The alleged perpetrators, according to Russian military personnel 
(who were unable to stop the hijacking), were "armed Abkhaz men." In what can 
only be described as typical "Keystone Cops fashion," the train left in an 
"unknown direction" with lots of shots fired, but no one (miraculously) was 
injured. The entire (600-strong) Russian garrison at Gudauta was unable to 
locate it for three days. The train, along with the surface-to-air missile system, 
reportedly was recovered, and subsequently departed for Russia on 3 
November. (INTERFAX, 1156 GMT, 6 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1106, via World 
News Connection) It's too bad no one thought to follow the train tracks. 
 
Speaking of trains 
Environmentalist groups such as Exotika and Greenpeace have long criticized 
Russian handling of hazardous materials during transit. According to Exotika, in 
Novouralsk in 1994 1,000 liters of a sulfuric solution containing uranium 
accidentally spilt along the train tracks. But Energy Minister Alexander 
Rumyantsev stated during a recent speech that "over the fifty years of 
transporting nuclear materials not a single accident had occurred in our [Russian] 
country." First Deputy Minister Valentin Ivanov also refuted the Exotika 
allegations but did state that "all future details surrounding trains and routes will 
remain secret." (IZVESTIA, 23 Nov 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Could the same Russian guards who "lost" the train in 
Georgia have been reassigned to Novouralsk?  
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Northern Fleet shakeup 
In one sweeping sickle-like motion, Russian President Putin has "purged" nearly 
the entire senior leadership of the Russian Northern Fleet. The shakeup occurred 
after a meeting between President Putin and Prosecutor General Vladimir 
Ustinov (who has been heading the Kursk investigation). The officers were 
dismissed, according to Navy spokesman Commander Vladimir Kuroedov, for 
serious flaws "at all levels of the [Kursk] command system and[those responsible 
for the] organization of training-combat activities." Northern Fleet Commander 
Admiral Vyacheslav Popov and Chief-of-Staff Vice Admiral Mikhail Motsak 
headed the list of persons fired. All of the 14 senior officers dismissed were 
responsible for the planning, training and combat readiness of the Kursk and her 
crew. Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Vladislav Putilin and at 
least one Duma deputy, Andrei Nikolaev, believe that underfunded military 
budgets often result in accidents from poor combat readiness and added stress 
on military personnel. They also predicted that more accidents are likely. 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 4 Dec 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
President Putin also has stated that there is no substantiated proof that the Kursk 
accident was caused by the collision with a foreign submarine. Vice Admiral 
Motsak had been a vocal proponent of the foreign submarine theory, seen by 
many as an attempt to shift responsibility away from the navy, and to Russia's 
long-time enemies. But President Putin no longer cites NATO as a threat to 
Russia, thus the need for a change of guard in the Northern Fleet. (BBC, 1 Dec 
01; via RFE/RL Newsline) Chief of the General Forces General Anatoly Kvashnin 
stated that Popov and Motsak were punished for general mistakes commanding 
the fleet, and not specifically for the Kursk accident. (EKHO MOSKVY RADIO, 1 
Dec 01; via RFE/RL Newsline) 
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Pacific Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Gennady Suchkov has been named as 
the new Northern Fleet commander. (INTERFAX, 5 Dec 01; via RFE/RL 
Newsline) He will have his hands full leading the fleet away from the Cold War 
mentality, while focusing on combat readiness, training and modernization 
issues. In this case drastic changes in leadership were warranted, especially 
after the continuous flow of negative media concerns on the state of the fleet. In 
the submarine force alone, incidents have ranged from drunken brawls to 
increased suicide rates to even criminal convictions of commanding officers. 
 
Officers and gentlemen? 
In many modern military, the officers are responsible for the health and welfare of 
their troops, and are generally held to the highest standards of personal conduct. 
According to Russian Military Prosecutor Justice Major General Valery Suchkov, 
the "crime rate among officers is what worries us. Over 100 officers were 
convicted [of crimes] over the last three years, including 67 senior [officer] ones. 
The convicts include the commander of a submarine force, two submarine 
commanders, and five unit commanders ... This year, we logged 17 corruption-
related crimes. In percentage, this is more than throughout the whole Far East 
Military District. Practice shows that crooked officers act together with private 
organizations and individuals dealing in equipment containing non-ferrous, rare, 
and precious metals, etc." (BOEVAYA VAKHTA, 5 Dec 01; What the Papers Say, 
via ISI Defense and Security Database) With over 100 Russian nuclear 
submarines tied up, rusting away, is it any wonder that theft of nuclear material 
has been a real concern? Although Russian officials are quick to say that such 
theft is impossible in Russia, these acknowledgements continue to raise doubts, 
rather then dispel Western fears. 
 
In the West, the conduct of officers responsible for the safekeeping of nuclear 
weapons and capital ships has been inseparable from the sanctity of national 
security. If senior officers who controlled nuclear weapons and ships were selling 
everything that wasn't nailed down, it would have monumental national security 
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implications. Evidently, not in Russia. And what happened to those responsible 
for the mismanagement of the Northern Fleet? Ex-Northern Fleet Commander 
Admiral Vyacheslav Popov has been named to a top post in the atomic energy 
ministry. (RIA-NOVOSTI, 1 Dec 01; via RFE/RL Newsline) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Remember us? 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Taken together, 
the area is geographically quite large, and is home to hundreds of millions of 
persons. Yet, it seems to have developed an odd habit of becoming invisible 
during certain times -- at least on some maps. Today is one of those times. 
 
Take, for example, the following statement from Lord George Robertson, the 
secretary-general of NATO, regarding the new NATO-Russia Council: "We are 
now united in the war against global terrorism," he said, "and we have a mighty 
obligation and duty to make sure that we don't throw away the fruits of that 
cooperation, but that instead we build on it, and we build a lasting relationship 
that will be in the interests of the people of Russia and the people of Western 
Europe as well." Lord Robertson indeed must have a very unique map. 
(FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 23 Nov 01; via lexis-nexis)  
 
The peoples of the former Soviet Union (and its former satellites), however, are 
perfectly clear about their geographic position. Despite recent attempts to tone 
down the rhetoric surrounding the new NATO-Russia rapprochement, they have 
been left scrambling to figure out where they fit in now. For Ukraine, the short-
term answer has become painfully clear -- in the arms of Russia. 
 
 20 
Ukraine's turn eastward did not begin after 11 September, of course. Since last 
year's Gongadze scandal, it has been to President Leonid Kuchma's great 
advantage to curry Russian support. To do so, he began turning his back on 
policies that his country had previously seen as vital to its independence. Closer 
military cooperation and increased Russian participation in privatization were just 
two benefits allocated to Russian President Vladimir Putin for his assistance. 
Still, Kuchma remained committed -- at least publicly -- to Ukrainian economic 
independence and integration into Western organizations. He and the rest of his 
administration seemed to remain relatively supportive of the country's position as 
a regional leader, following through with plans for the institutionalization of 
GUUAM. Much of this commitment was produced by steady behind-the-scenes 
pressure from Western officials and organizations, coupled with financial 
incentives. Ukraine was valued as a "counterweight" to Russia. "Engagement" 
with the country was seen as vital in the world of geopolitics. Not anymore 
apparently -- at least for some.  
 
Since the terrorist attacks on the United States, Western (and in particular West 
European) attention has shifted into Russian pacification mode. The Russian 
"sphere of influence" -- roundly rejected when Boris Yel'tsin proposed it in 1992 -- 
has been de facto recognized. Russia is thanked for "allowing" US and British 
planes to use Central Asian bases in sovereign states. Russia is limply criticized 
for dropping bombs on two villages deep within Georgian territory. Russia is 
praised for finally fulfilling one part of an agreement to withdraw from Moldova 
(removing armaments), while little is said about its failure to fulfill the other part 
(removing troops) At the same time, attention becomes so concentrated on 
integrating Russia into NATO that any focus on the countries in this sphere is 
severely diminished (or worse, filtered through the eyes of Russia). 
Consequently, President Kuchma has placed Ukraine firmly under the Putin 
umbrella. Recently, following a meeting with Putin, Kuchma suggested the need 
for "closer integration of the former Soviet republics," and announced that "the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the resulting borders have created big 
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obstacles in our life." (ITAR-TASS, 1510 GMT, 29 Nov 01; Federal News 
Service, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Russian-Ukrainian military cooperation has increased most substantially since 11 
September. The two sides have completed draft agreements detailing 
"interaction on the arms markets of third countries," undertaking "research in the 
development of new weapons," and setting up "cooperation in repairing, 
modernizing and testing warships of the two countries." (ITAR-TASS, 1434 GMT, 
1 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1201, via World News Connection) Additionally, 
ITAR-TASS has reported that Russia soon will begin "upgrading MiG-29s for the 
Ukrainian air force to MiG-29 SMT." (ITAR-TASS, 1312 GMT, 3 Dec 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-1203, via World News Connection) And, there have been calls by 
some Russian officials for joint command posts for anti-missile defense forces. 
(A&G INFORMATION SERVICES, 22 Oct 01; via InfoTrac) The impact on 
Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace program has not been 
discussed, although one would imagine that the changing world environment 
could lead to changes in the program itself. 
 
Meanwhile, the Russian government is pressing on with its timeworn calls for the 
elevation of Russian to a state language, and is supporting the new NTV-Ukraine 
television station, which will go on the air in January. "We consider ourselves the 
junior partner of the Russians," owner and media magnate Vadim Rabinovich 
said. "Making a new television program," he explained, "we know that 99 percent 
of Ukraine's people want to watch Russian channels and read Russian 
newspapers. Ukraine and Russia form their own media spaces, but it is 
impossible to break these ties." (INTERFAX, 1705 GMT, 30 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-1130, via World News Connection) It is unclear where Rabinovich found his 
figure of 99%. And Rabinovich has not explained how he will avoid the Ukrainian 
law requiring that all television channels carry over 50% of their programming in 
Ukrainian. But then again, the Ukrainian government hasn't challenged him or his 
plans. 
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The West (with the exception of the United States) also has not challenged any 
of Ukraine's latest policy moves, even when given a simple opportunity to do so. 
For example, over two years ago, as Ukraine began contemplating Chernobyl's 
final shutdown, the country faced an emergency in its energy sphere. Its arrears 
to Russia for gas and electricity were increasing exponentially, and the loss of 
the energy from Chernobyl's one remaining reactor would exacerbate its 
dependence on its neighbor. In order to convince Ukraine to shut down the 
reactor, the G-7 countries agreed to help fund the construction of two new 
reactors. After years of delays and wrangling, this was finally supposed to be 
accomplished when the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) offered a loan of $215 million. 
 
While the European wrangling continued, Russia began expressing an interest in 
assisting in the construction of the reactors. At the time, Ukraine shied away from 
Russia's offer. But over the last year, the EBRD has been pressuring Ukraine to 
increase electricity tariffs. Unless the country agreed to do this, the organization 
said, it would not release the loan money. Last week, Ukraine refused to meet 
the condition, and said it would instead accept Russia's offer. "Now that the world 
economy is slowing down," Kuchma explained, "our major and most energy-
consuming industries have reached the breakeven point of their profitability. If we 
raise the tariffs, this will bring Ukrainian industry to ruin." He added, "But we are 
ready to hold talks [with the EBRD]." (STB TV, 1700 GMT, 3 Dec 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Unfortunately, there would be no immediate talks, and at this point it is unclear 
what the talks would accomplish. Shortly after Ukraine's announcement,, the 
EBRD spokesman questioned "whether it is worth pursuing the project in its 
current form." More importantly, when questioned about Russia's involvement, he 
seemed uninformed. "We do not understand," he said, "what Russia can 
contribute to the completion of the reactors, which technologies or conditions." 
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(ONE PLUS ONE TV, 1730 GMT, 5 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
markets Database) 
 
The EBRD may not understand Russia's future contribution, but the significance 
of the EBRD's contribution should have been very clear. With Western financing, 
Ukrainian reactors remain a Ukrainian project and a Ukrainian asset. Ukraine 
would be given a small piece of energy independence. Without the financing, the 
project becomes yet another Russian project on Ukrainian soil. The EBRD's 
actions may ensure that this is exactly what it will become. 
 
As NATO countries work to create a new relationship with Russia, it is imperative 
that they not forget the countries in the middle -- the countries that fought so long 
for independence. Indeed, this year, Ukraine has chosen an eastward path. If 
Western countries continue to focus only on engaging Russia, that choice likely 
will continue indefinitely. But if the country is pressured and coddled and given 
the necessary incentives, it has some of the greatest potential in the area, both 
domestically and as a regional guarantor of stability. 
 
Not so long ago, analysts and politicians asked, "Who lost Russia?" It would be 
lamentable if, three years from now, those same analysts and politicians found 
themselves asking, "Who lost Ukraine?"  
 
BELARUS 
Still ticking 
Despite Alyaksandr Lukashenka's increasing attempts to silence members of the 
media and opposition, a small group of dissidents continues to fight for attention. 
Although in today's climate very little attention is forthcoming, dissent persists. 
The family and friends of missing journalists and politicians are among the most 
vocal.  
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On 9 December, 400 people formed a human chain -- called the "Chain of 
Concerned People" -- in central Minsk during an "unauthorized" protest. The 
wives of missing businessman Anatol Krasowski, opposition leaders Viktor 
Gonchar and Henadz Karpenka, and journalist Dmitri Zavadsky were among the 
protesters, and they once again called on officials to investigate the 
disappearances of their husbands. Their calls fell on deaf ears, of course. The 
wives suggest that even many Belarusian citizens seem to have accepted 
Lukashenka's claims that he has no knowledge about the cases. The wife of 
Karpenka, however, sadly predicted that in the future "many" Belarusians will be 
forced to deal with "the questions that are now haunting the families of the dead." 
(BELAPAN, 1506 GMT, 9 Dec 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
More bombings in Pankisi 
According to information provided by Georgian border guards, on the night of 27 
November Georgian territory was bombed by Mi-24 helicopters and Su-25 fighter 
aircraft. The planes intruded 50 km inside Georgian territory. First, the village of 
Birkiani in Akhmeta District was bombed and then the Mta-Tusheti province was 
attacked. Thirty-six shells hit the village the Omalo alone. Villagers fled their 
homes and two shepherds reportedly were killed. 
 
According to Georgia's air traffic control, there is video evidence which 
documents the movement of the aircraft. The air traffic control radar screen 
recorded the violation of Georgia's airspace at 2120 local time [1720 GMT]. The 
duty controller noticed initially four and then another two aircraft in the northern 
section of the country's airspace. "The six aircraft entered Georgian airspace 
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from the direction of Nalchik. At the end of the 20-minute operation, the group of 
fighter aircraft disappeared in the direction of Russia. " 
 
The bombed areas were inspected by officers of the Georgian State Border 
Guard Department and the Ministry of State Security, as well as the president's 
representative in the province of Kakheti. "The area was shelled with NURS-type 
rockets. Anti-tank shells were also used," Korneli Salia, chief of staff of the 
Georgian border troops, said. The fragments will be presented to Russia. 
 
Asked by the Georgian television correspondent, Giorgi Tskhvitava, "Do you 
think it was Russian aircraft that bombed the area?" Salia responded that, "No 
one else in this region has aircraft capable of flying at night." (GEORGIAN 
TELEVISION, 1600 GMT, 28 Nov 01, and KAVKASIA-PRESS, 1150 GMT, 28 
Nov 01; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Georgia signaled that it was taking measures to protect itself against future 
attacks. The country's armed forces were placed on combat alert and anti-aircraft 
units were deployed in the Pankisi and Arkhoti gorges. According to unnamed 
senior military officials, other defense ministry units also will be deployed there in 
case of urgent needs to protect the region. (GEORGIAN TV, 30 Nov 01; via BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring) 
 
Shevardnadze in Moscow 
While attending the CIS summit in Moscow, Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze said he had decided not to broach the subject of the 
bombardments at the main meeting. He would discuss it privately in the now 
traditional one-on-one meetings with the Russian president. Shevardnadze told 
journalists that this was not the first time that Russian planes bombed Georgian 
villages, that no one was hurt (in contradiction of earlier reports - ML), and that 
he proposed a joint Russian-Georgian commission to investigate the matter. 
Putin commented that "it is necessary to investigate this more thoroughly and 
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perhaps not even wait for the next time. We hope that nothing like this will ever 
happen again." Then Putin went on to question, "what kind of bombing was it if 
air strikes were delivered on settlements and no one was hurt?" 
 
Having said that, Putin segued into retelling dubious reports (emanating from 
Russian security services) to the effect that Chechens and Arabs had clashed in 
the Pankisi gorge. This, too, according to Putin, should be studied carefully. 
(FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 30 Nov 01; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The new joint commission may prove to be a convenient way to ignore or 
suppress the ample evidence provided by Georgian border guards. Potentially, it 
also could play a more sinister role, the one mapped out by Putin: It could 
become the vehicle by which Russia gains access to the Pankisi Gorge with 
Georgia's acquiescence. 
 
In a post-summit interview with Moskovskiye novosti, Shevardnadze hinted that 
an agreement with regard to Pankisi has been reached. "As for the Chechen 
problem, Vladimir Vladimirovich is well aware of our difficulties and he 
understands that we cannot conduct a large-scale military operation in an area 
inhabited by civilians [with] 7,000 refugees, including militants. But we worked out 
mechanisms for solving that problem together. I won't tell you all the details, but 
the public in Russia and Georgia will soon learn about it."  
 
Shevardnadze also said that Gelaev's October excursion into the Kodori Gorge 
was prompted by a "provocation." According to him "Gelaev's people were told 
that they would leave Abkhazia for the North Caucasus through a mountain pass. 
Instead, they encountered fire. I was told that Russia had guaranteed them safe 
passage." Reportedly, Gelaev's unit could not get to Russia from the Pankisi 
Gorge since that section of the border is well-protected and -monitored. Hence, 
the promise of safe passage back to Russia through Abkhazia enticed him to 
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leave the Pankisi Gorge. (MOSKOVKKIYE NOVOSTI, 4-10 Dec 01; Kremlin 
Package, via ISI Emerging Markets Database. For more about the October 
incident see THE NIS OBSERVED, 24 Oct 01.) 
 
Feeble international response 
Although it was widely anticipated that US Secretary of State Colin Powell would 
discuss the bombing of Georgian villages during his Moscow visit on 9-10 
December, he apparently failed to do so. Last month, the State Department 
statement indicated that US officials would raise the matter with their Russian 
counterparts. However, there has been no indication in the US or Russian media 
that any US figure, including Gen. Powell, has discussed these matters with 
Russian authorities. 
 
At the 28 November daily briefing, State Department spokesman Richard 
Boucher commented that, "We have some confirmation that there were 
helicopters that entered Georgian air space from Russian territory, subsequently 
attacked areas on the Georgian side of the border in what's known as, I think, the 
Pankisi Valley, Pankisi Gorge. There are unconfirmed reports now of two deaths 
on the ground in the course of these attacks. We have consistently supported the 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Georgia. We are deeply concerned 
about these intrusions which undermine stability in this region, and we've raised 
the situation at senior levels with the Russian government in the past and will do 
so again in the near future." (www.state.gov) 
 
On 4 December, the ministerial council of the OSCE discussed the events in 
Georgia and adopted a decision. However, there is barely a mention in regard to 
the two most serious issues for Georgia's security: the repeated bombings of 
Georgian territory by Russian aircraft, and the refusal of the Russian side to 
abide by OSCE-sponsored agreements to close its military bases on Georgian 
territory.  
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The decision applauds Russia and Georgia for setting up a joint commission to 
investigate the bombardments of Georgian villages. However, the OSCE easily 
could obviate the need for this commission. The OSCE has a monitoring mission 
on the border between Georgia and Chechnya. If the OSCE would make public 
the results of this monitoring, it would shed light immediately on the confusing 
and conflicting claims. This is precisely the purpose of having an objective 
international presence in a volatile area. All that the head of the OSCE mission to 
Georgia, Jean-Michel Lacombe, could bring himself to say was "we have noticed 
some unusual movements and the bombing of Georgian territory. " (GEORGIAN 
TELEVISION, 1600 GMT, 28 Nov 01; via BBC Monitoring) This reticence renders 
OSCE activities useless. Now the OSCE ministers speak of expanding the 
border monitoring mission to cover the Ingush segment of the border. This, too, 
will be futile if their findings are kept secret. 
 
Similarly, the ministers made no mention of the fact that Russia has violated its 
promise to return the Gudauta base to Georgian control by 1 July 2001. Instead, 
the OSCE foreign ministers "look forward" to an "early transfer" of the base to 
Georgian authority. 
 
The decision says: 
1. We express our firm commitment to support the independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Georgia (....) 
2. We welcome developments in the peace process in Tshkhinvali region/South 
Ossetia. (...) 
3. We reconfirm the leading role of the United Nations in Abkhazia, Georgia and 
the importance of the Geneva process as the main framework of negotiations. 
We condemn the shooting down of a UNOMIG helicopter on 11 October and 
urge the honest fulfillment of all agreements, including, inter alia, the Moscow 
Cease-fire Agreement of 14 May 1994. We call for the resumption of a 
constructive dialogue aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement, including 
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defining the political status of Abkhazia as a sovereign entity within the state of 
Georgia. (...) 
4. We acknowledge the significant contribution to stability and confidence in the 
region made by the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation along the border 
between Georgia and the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation. We 
direct the Permanent Council to examine proposals to extend the Border 
Monitoring Operation to the Georgian border with the Ingush Republic of the 
Russian Federation. 
5. We welcome the progress made this year towards meeting the commitments 
made in Istanbul on the future of Russian forces in Georgia. The closure of the 
Russian base at Vaziani and the withdrawal of the equipment from the Russian 
base at Gudauta were important steps forward. We look forward to the 
implementation of the other Istanbul commitments. We call for the resumption of 
the Georgian-Russian negotiations concerning the elaboration of appropriate 
transparency measures with regard to the closure of the base at Gudauta. We 
hope for an early legal transfer of the infrastructure of the former Russian military 
base at Gudauta. We also look forward to an early agreement on the duration 
and modalities of the functioning of the remaining Russian military facilities. We 
welcome the contributions made by Participating States to the voluntary fund to 
support the withdrawal from Russian facilities, and agree to consider on an 
urgent basis proposals from the parties for the use of the fund. 
6. We welcome the aspiration to good-neighbourly relations and development of 
co-operation that was manifested at the meeting between the President of 
Russia, Vladimir Putin, and the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, on 
30 November 2001, as well as the agreement to establish a joint commission to 
investigate the reported cases of bombardments in the border areas of the 
territory of Georgia. (STATEMENT OF THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, DECISION 
2, 4 Dec 01) 
  
The decision barely mentions the UN helicopter that was shot down over Georgia 
in October. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia refuted Abkhaz claims that 
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Chechens were responsible for the 8 October crash of the UNOMIG helicopter: 
"[T]here is not enough of a basis for the conclusions made by the Abkhaz probe 
into the disaster, in particular, for the statements that it was downed by Chechen 
rebels from Ruslan Gelaev's group." 
 
"Moreover, the results of the technical examination of the helicopter's debris, 
which is now being conducted by the Ukrainian administration, are still not 
known," the mission's press release says. "Before making any conclusions, the 
UNOMIG thinks it fit to wait for the results of the work of the above-mentioned 
commission...." ( INTERFAX, 1450 GMT, 30 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1130, via 
World News Connection) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami and Michael Donahue 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Democracy can wait 
Several weeks ago, Kazakh Prime Minister Qasymzhomart Toqaev demanded 
that several senior ministers, including the deputy prime minister, be removed 
from their posts. Toqaev threatened that, unless the officials were dismissed, he 
himself would resign. These ministers, have, with "considerable regret" on the 
part of President Nursultan Nazarbaev, been removed from their positions. 
(CENTRAL ASIA CAUCASUS ANAYLYST, 5 Dec 01) 
 
The ministers were members of a recently formed movement, "Democratic 
Choice," which mandates the formation of an independent judiciary as well as an 
increase in parliamentary powers. Under the country's constitution, support for 
such a movement is illegal, and members of the government must "adhere to a 
single view." (FBIS-SOV-2001-1129, 29 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1129, via 
World News Connection)  
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There are indications, however, that the forced resignations were not simply the 
result of political intrigues between Nazarbaev, Toqaev and Democratic Choice, 
but rather were part of a larger web of intrigue involving the president's own 
family. 
 
The president's son-in-law, Rahat Aliev, held the post of deputy chairman of the 
National Security Committee, but was pushed to resign from this post, 
supposedly because he had become estranged from Nazarbaev's daughter. 
(EURASIA INSIGHT, 27 Nov 01; via Eurasianet) However, if Nazarbaev's 
relationship with Aliev had become strained, it certainly did not remain so for 
long. A mere four days after his resignation, Aliev was appointed deputy 
commander of Nazarbaev's Presidential Guard. (CENTRAL ASIA CAUCASUS 
ANALYST, 5 Dec 01) 
 
The real reason for Aliev being shuffled around may lie in his links to the media. 
Nazarbaev's family (but most especially his daughter, Dariga Nazarbaev, and her 
husband, Aliev) own and control most of the country's media organizations, 
including Alma Media, Kazakhstan Today, and the country's leading TV Station, 
Khabar. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 27 Nov 01; via Eurasianet) Several leading 
members of Democratic Choice had been trying, through outlets favorable to 
them, to break that media control. It is obvious, since Aliev's resignation on 14 
November came days before Toqaev's ultimatum, that Nazarbaev wished to 
ensure that his son-in-law remained politically untarnished. 
 
While personally motivated tampering with the government is worrisome in and of 
itself, the timing of such action provides the greatest pause for thought. The 
attempt by Nazarbaev to tighten his power comes at a time of great US 
involvement in Central Asia. Indeed, US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited 
Almaty between 9 and 10 December and met with Nazarbaev, less than two 
weeks after the purge of senior government officials. There was every indication 
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that the war in Afghanistan was discussed, but little mention of the status of 
democratization. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 10 Dec 01; via Eurasianet) 
 
It was to be hoped that US involvement in the region would lay the foundations 
for democratization. Tragically, it seems that the opposite is true. 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Return to oppression, under the veil of counter-terrorism 
As a full and committed partner in the "war on terror," Uzbekistan stands 
shoulder to shoulder with the nations of the world fighting the common enemy 
and keeping the world safe for freedom-loving peoples. At least that's the claim of 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov and his largely state-controlled media services. 
However, behind the publicity shots and officially released statements of 
"common goals" of "peace and stability" lie sinister-looking signals of a return to 
authoritarian, and even dictatorial, rule. 
 
By now it is common knowledge that the October agreement between the United 
States and Karimov included American security guarantees in exchange for the 
use of military facilities for launching offensive operations against the Taliban. 
However, this agreement seems to have sent the Uzbek president a message 
that, with America looking after his external security, he could focus entirely on 
internal security, and in any manner that he chooses. As a result, since the 11 
September attacks, and under the guise of fighting terrorism, President Karimov 
has taken serious steps to solidify his power for the long term and to restrict 
further basic freedoms in Uzbekistan. 
 
Long a target for the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the 
government in Tashkent has taken the 11 September attacks as the most recent 
excuse to crack down on freedom of speech and religion. In an apparent "house-
cleaning" that stems from a failed 1999 assassination attempt on Karimov, the 
Uzbek government has requested the extradition of dissident and writer 
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Mohammed Solih from the Czech Republic. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 4 Dec 01; via 
Eurasianet) Such tactics to eliminate opposition leaders are common, as are 
claims of mass arrests and show trials with pre-determined outcomes. 
 
Beginning a governmental public relations offensive in recent weeks to improve 
the image of his regime for the international community, the Tashkent press has 
been complicit in publicizing Karimov's humanitarian strides, both real and 
imagined. In his never-ending effort to be seen as an "enlightened" despot, 
President Karimov recently supported legislation to cut the number of offenses in 
the Uzbek criminal code that carry a death sentence from eight to four. 
(EURASIA INSIGHT, 27 Nov 01; via Eurasianet) Opponents and global activists 
still claim, however, that the death penalty is used to oppress religious and 
political dissenters. 
 
In his most recent gesture to the international community, President Karimov 
reached a deal with US Secretary of State Colin Powell to open the Friendship 
Bridge, connecting the Uzbek and Afghan banks of the Amu Darya River. By 
opening the bridge, which had remained closed for four years, President Karimov 
apparently has reduced the transit time for humanitarian assistance between 
Termez, Uzbekistan, and the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, a major refugee 
center, by 10 days. (BBC WORLD SERVICE, 9 Dec 01; via BBC News) 
 
Taken at face value, these two "humanitarian" gestures have improved the 
quality of life for the people of the region, and demonstrate a positive change in 
the often-criticized Karimov government. However, not satisfied simply with the 
"quality" of his rule, President Karimov has searched for some creative ways to 
get his hands on a more lasting authority. On the eve of Secretary Powell's visit, 
the Uzbek parliament endorsed a proposal to make Karimov "president for life." 
(EURASIA INSIGHT, 7 Dec 01; via Eurasianet) While no doubt Secretary Powell 
was impressed with the irony that the first American Congress had discussed 
bestowing George Washington with the same honor, the secretary noted the 
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current state of political affairs in Tashkent. Despite offering assurances that 
America's commitment to the region would be long-term, Powell voiced concerns 
about human and political rights and the slow pace of democratization in 
Uzbekistan. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 9 Dec 01; via Eurasianet) Secretary 
Powell's words surely offer hope to the citizens of Uzbekistan and human rights 
groups around the globe who, heretofore, have been somewhat alarmed with the 
United States' apparent willingness to play quid pro quo with anyone willing to 
help in the hunt for Osama bin Laden. 
 
Despite these strong words by Secretary Powell, however, America has a long 
history of mutually beneficial relationships with less-than-savory governmental 
leaders. And as long as there remains utility in a relationship with President 
Karimov, one shouldn't expect little things like "human rights" or "democracy" to 
get in the American government's way. While internally the state-controlled press 
continues to put Karimov's spin on domestic and international affairs, the average 
Uzbek and informed international observer can see clearly what has happened 
with increasing frequency in Uzbekistan since 11 September. Suppression of 
basic freedoms, elimination of enemies, and movements towards dictatorship 
seem to be in fashion this season in Tashkent. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
OSCE missions expected to close 
As the OSCE offices in Estonia and Latvia prepare to close their doors, these two 
Baltic states face one of the most serious challenges to their bid for European 
Union (EU) membership and NATO accession. Both countries have undergone 
immense scrutiny for their policies concerning the Russian-speaking minorities 
who reside within their borders. Now the OSCE is content that Latvia and Estonia 
are in compliance with acceptable standards; however Russia adamantly rejects 
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the OSCE claims and continues to assert that there is a serious problem in the 
area. 
 
In Estonia, the OSCE has monitored the situation since 1993, and feels that the 
OSCE mission there has fulfilled its mandate. The mission points to the decision 
to repeal the Estonian Language requirement for parliament candidates as 
clearing the last stumbling block to full compliance with the mandate. This 
stumbling block was removed on 21 November and it now seems clear that the 
mission will be closed by the end of the year. (ETA, 1420 GMT, 26 Nov 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-1126, via World News Connection) Meanwhile, the situation in Latvia 
is not as clearly defined., Besides receiving sharp criticism from Russia, the 
OSCE mission has come into conflict with the Council of Europe and its findings. 
(BNS, 0745 GMT 3 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1203, via World News Connection) 
 
The Council of Europe claims that Latvia is still not fulfilling its human rights 
responsibilities. The latest charge is that the Latvia police have been using 
methods of investigation that are incompatible with acceptable standards, such 
as beatings, electric shock, and asphyxiation, when questioning suspects. 
(LETA, 1421 GMT, 23 Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1123, via World News 
Connection) The Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs have denied the accusations. However, these charges support Moscow's 
claims that the Baltic states are not respecting the rights of the Russian-speaking 
minorities. 
 
The Russian foreign ministry, on 28 November, claimed that "European 
institutions still have much serious work to do in Latvia." (BNS, 1028 GMT, 29 
Nov 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1129 via World News Connection) The Foreign Ministry 
goes on to note that the conference on bilingual education, held in Riga the week 
of 21 November, shows that little progress has been made in the area of 
education because the methods being used are unscientific and undeveloped. 
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Furthermore, the conference purportedly demonstrates that there is a political 
voice within Latvia which the authorities cannot ignore. 
 
Despite these recent public disagreements over the findings of the international 
communities, the OSCE will consider the fate of its missions on 20 December. 
(BNS, 0745 GMT, 3 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1203, via World News Connection) 
The OSCE already has decided that the offices are no longer relevant. Yet while 
the outcome of the meeting appears to be predetermined, serious discussion 
may ensue as to whether the closing of these missions promotes security and 
cooperation within Europe. 
 
The debate could have far-reaching implications for Estonia and Latvia. Latvian 
Foreign Minister Indulis Berzin, alluded to the main issue at stake, when he 
stated, "Russia's opinion on human rights in Latvia has been different from that of 
the EU for a long time but Latvia sought membership of the EU, not the CIS, 
therefore it is the EU position that matters to the Baltic State." (BNS, 0745 GMT, 
3 Dec 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-1203, via World News Connection) Invitations to join 
the EU and NATO could hinge on which perception of the human rights situation 
is believed. While the OSCE decision would affirm its belief that acceptable 
standards have been reached, the closing of the mission offices will not close the 
debate. 
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